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Abstract
This thesis examines the effect of the Revised Family Law implemented in Ethiopia in
2000, using a difference-in-difference approach. The main data used is from the De-
mographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for Ethiopia from 2000 and 2005. Utilizing the
different regional timing of the implementation of the law, the effect of the law change
is measured clear from other underlying trends. Focusing on the outcome variables for
education and violence against women, the main results show that there is no increase in
years of education attained, but that there is a positive change in norms as fewer women
answer that it is justifiable to hit a wife. It is important to quantify the relations between
policy and outcomes in order to give policy recommendations that work and that will
improve women’s lives. Because cultures and norms differ widely, it is important to study
empirical data in the country concerned and not only extrapolate knowledge from studies
done other places in the world.
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1 Introduction
For a long time there was only focus on men when discussing economic growth and
societal progress in general. By doing this, half of the world’s productive population was
being ignored. Boserup (1970) was an influential publication which drew attention to the
role of women in agricultural and industrial development. It discussed male and female
farming systems, polygamy, education and more topics concerning women and economic
development. By providing data as evidence, Boserup showed how large contributions
were made by women everywhere.
Endless research on gender issues has followed and organizations like The United Nations
Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women have been formed. The
World Bank group Women Business and the Law publishes a report called ”Removing
Barriers to Economic Inclusion”, focusing on the legal and regulatory differences between
men and women. Recognizing the legal differences between men and women is the first
step towards equal opportunities and female empowerment.
General poverty reduction, without female empowerment, may worsen the situation for
women, strengthening the gender bias in child survival Sen (1999) postulates. This re-
enforces the need for measures specifically aimed at women. Sen focuses on women’s
agency, which goes beyond women’s well-being. Factors determining women’s agency are
employment outside the home, ownership rights, literacy, education and decision mak-
ing. Some of these factors will be used in this thesis to measure an increase in women’s
agency. Sen introduced the capability approach as an approach to welfare economics.
Sen’s capability approach is important as it says something about peoples opportunities,
what they are able to be and do. Being able to get work outside the home, earn an
independent income and having the ability to get an education has a far greater reach
than only affecting the individual. It gives women in society power and opportunities,
even if they do not exercise their abilities actively. Their bargaining power increases by
improving their outside opportunities, allowing them to choose better for themselves and
their children.
This thesis is organized as follows. I begin with introducing the existing literature on
policy evaluations, household bargaining power, education and violence. This is followed
by a short introduction to Ethiopia as a country, with a subsection concerning women’s
status in Ethiopia. This is followed by some background on the law change, and where it
was implemented. The data is introduced and the methodology explained including the
limitations and assumptions of the difference-in-difference approach. The estimations then
follow. Using the difference-in-difference method I focus on education and the attitudes
towards violence against women. There seems to be no significant change in years of
education, but a positive change in attitudes where less women find it justifiable to hit a
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wife in various situation. There does not seem to be a change in the attitudes attributable
to the law change among men in the sample.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Household bargaining power
In the quest of explaining how household bargaining power is distributed, theoretical
models with differing assumptions have been developed. Becker (1981) introduced the
unitary household model of intra-household resource allocation which assumes that the
household bargaining power does not matter. The resources will always be divided in
order to get the maximum amount of total household utility. This theory has however
repeatedly been empirically tested and does not seem to hold. Alderman et al. (1995) give
an overview and are critical of the unitary model because it does not take into account the
process by which resources are divided within the household. If individuals have differing
preferences, they would all have to be taken into consideration to be able to assess the
well-being of the household. Thomas (1990) finds that income controlled by the mother
has a greater effect on her family’s health than income in the hands of the father. The
impact of unearned income on child survival was twenty times greater if the income was
brought in by the mother than if it was brought in by the father. In Duflo (2000) the
effect of a pension transfer on children’s nutritional status is evaluated, and she finds that
pensions received by women had a large impact on the anthropometric status for girls, but
little effect on boys. No similar effects were found for pensions received by men, showing
that the gender of the recipient of the pension plays a vital role in the distribution of
resources. Following robust proof against the unitary household model of intra-household
resource allocation, other types of models have since been introduced. These are the
cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models which use game theory to explain the
power struggle between household members with conflicting interests. The bargaining
power one member has is determined by the opportunity cost of staying in the household.
This is often assumed to be determined by the member’s assets and resources.
Li & Wu (2011) address the problem caused by the lack of a proper measure for women’s
relative bargaining power which makes the empirical examination of intra-household re-
source allocation difficult. Li & Wu sum up the most common measures for bargaining
power as being wage and non-wage income, assets controlled by individuals at the time
of household formation, sex ratios at marriage ages and laws related to divorce. Li &
Wu (2011) however try to find another exogenous measure for relative bargaining power
and use gender of the first-born child to reflect the status for the woman in the family.
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Li & Wu’s results show that having a first-born son significantly increases a woman’s
nutrient intakes and lowers her probability of being underweight. This shows that gender
of the first-born child is important also for the female’s health and thereby also her labor
supply.
In Doss (1996), the share of assets owned by women is used as a measure of women’s
bargaining power. Using household survey data from Ghana she shows that assets owned
by women have a significant impact on household expenditure decisions. She uses a
theoretical framework including bargaining power for the test, finding that the unitary
household model does not hold.
Doss (2012) was published in the World Development Report 2012 by the World Bank.
She identifies four different types of research which fall under the intra-household issue
category: testing the unitary model of the household, testing whether the household
decisions are efficient, identifying determinants of resource allocation within the household
and experiments designed to provide understanding of the processes of intra-household
decision making. Testing whether there is an increase in decision making by the women
after an empowering law change as is done in this thesis would fall under the category of
identifying determinants of resource allocation within the household.
Doss (2012) also brings attention to the fact that the inferential approach is used as
introduced by Thomas (1990). Because we don’t have direct information on what choices
women would make if they had increased bargaining power, we infer that women prefer
the new outcome. An example would be if we see an increased spending on food when
a woman owns more of the household assets, we infer that the woman has used her
bargaining power to obtain this outcome.
2.2 Policy Evaluations
There are several ways to evaluate the impact of a policy change or implementation
of a program quantitatively. Depending on the data available, one can use propensity
score matching, difference-in-difference regressions, regression discontinuity or instrumen-
tal variables to try to extract the true effect of the program in question.
Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo (2010) look at how the change in family law in Ethiopia
in 2000 affected the decisions of women to enter the labor force. Data is used from the
Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) from 2000 and 2005 which cover all regions of the
country in both years. They estimate the effect using the difference-in-difference approach
which is feasible because there is data from before and after the law change, where different
regions implement the law at different times. For the difference-in-difference estimations
to be robust we would prefer to see data that span over a longer period of time to capture
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the trends. It is crucial that the trends would have been the same in the implementing and
non-implementing regions without the treatment. Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo (2010)
suppose that the effects work through two channels, one that is immediate and one that
is delayed. The law will have a direct effect on women increasing the labor supply when
the husband can no longer legally deny the wife to work outside the home. The delayed
effect will occur because the future bargaining position of women will improve. A higher
age at marriage gives the women more time to accumulate their own resources and get
more education.
Stevenson & Wolfers (2006) estimated the changes in suicide, domestic violence, and
spousal murder rates caused by the changes in the divorce laws across different states in
the US. Because it is often stated that there are many negative aspects of unilateral divorce
laws, they wish to show that this is not the case when looking at the broader picture.
Being divorced brings with it a more unhealthy lifestyle, and a worsening of the financial
situation for the women. By examining suicide rates they attempt to find a quantifiable
measure of well-being. Their main findings show a significant decrease in domestic violence
and suicide rates following the change in divorce laws. They propose that the effect works
through two channels. First it allows women to escape from destructive marriages, thus
raising the divorce rates. The second effect works directly on the household bargaining
power as the outside option changes for the spouses. The effects grow over time with
the full effect occurring fifteen to twenty years following the law change. For this thesis
I unfortunately do not have data over such a long time period after the law change in
Ethiopia in 2000. The effects found may not have reached their full potential yet.
In a paper by Heggeness (2009), the outcome variable is children’s education, examining
the effect of legalization of divorce in Chile in 2004. Heggeness assumes that an increase
in children’s education is a proxy for increased bargaining power in the household for the
women. A difference-in-difference approach is used to identify the effects. Her results
show that the legalization of divorce increased the opportunity cost of remaining married.
It increased bargaining power within the household for women, causing education for
children to increase.
2.3 Education and violence
I will use changes in educational attainment and opinions about violence against women
to measure women’s well-being. There are other factors that play a role in determining the
well-being of women, but the education and violence variables should be able to capture
some improvement in the lives of women after the law change - if there are some.
4
2.3.1 Education
Poor households are less likely to invest in female education (Kravdal 2004). There is
only a small chance that the girl will get a good job, and if she does, it will be for
the benefit of the family of the husband whom she will marry and live with. There is
thus an incentive problem regarding investment in daughters of the family. Education
is correlated with autonomy and empowerment of women. Women with more education
have more knowledge about health issues and they are better suited to solve problems.
In this way there is a strong link between education and mortality. Knowing more about
health issues and medicine will ensure that the women are more willing to go to another
village and exert some effort in order to assure that her children get vaccinated. Caldwell
(1986) shows that education is the key factor for life expectancy, and that it may be
more important than income. There is a strong relation between autonomy, education,
nutrition, prevention and treatment of diseases. More education prevents child mortality,
and reduces fertility (Dre`ze & Murthi 2001). Decreased fertility improves the health of
the mother both by relieving her from giving birth and relieving her from the experience
of child death. The education of women is also linked to the education of their husbands.
A husband with more education may be influenced more by the outside world and may
be more modern in terms of how he treats his wife and children.
In Kravdal (2002), the Demographic and Health Surveys are used to show that education
has individual as well as aggregate effects. More education in the community depresses
the birth rate of all women, even the uneducated ones. Having many children may be a
burden for the individual as well as for society because of population growth. Being able
to reduce and control fertility is considered an important goal that will result in better
health and a better economic situation for families in developing countries.
Table 3 shows that education is increasing for both the rural and urban population, but
the gap stays the same at on average 5.2 years. The scope of the estimations that follow
is to find out whether the law change can be said to be the cause of this steady increase
in years of education, or whether it is a general trend caused by other factors. As will be
shown, none of the estimations show any significant increase that can be linked to the law
change. Other policies, like the education and training policy introduced in 1994, and a
general trend of empowerment for women may have had a greater effect.
2.3.2 Violence and norms
In a qualitative study conducted by Yigzaw et al. (2010) in Northwest Ethiopia, the per-
ceptions and attitudes towards violence against women were examined using the Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys. Most subjects were against beating someone, acknowledging
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that it is wrong. However, some groups thought that beating was so common that it was
acceptable under some circumstances. Some women even went so far as justifying beating
claiming it was a sign that the husband loved his wife. The man is supposed to correct
and reprimand the wife, and if he does not wish to punish her when she does something
that is considered wrong, he is seen as unmanly. There were also respondents who were
against physical violence no matter the reason.
In DHS (2011b), concern is raised about the common nature and acceptance of domestic
violence in society. It degrades women and leads to disempowerment. Using data on
the attitudes towards wife beating from the DHS 2011, it is shown that two out of three
women believe beating is justified in at least one of the situations mentioned in the survey.
The acceptance of wife beating is inversely correlated with wealth and education. This
gives yet another reason to promote more education in order to improve women’s well-
being.
The law is a powerful tool to ensure the rights and interests of women, however there
often are obstacles that may render such laws powerless in reality. Kameri-Mbote (2002)
emphasizes that the lives of women and men are affected by a plurality of norms. She
defines customary law as: ”...the law of small-scale communities which people living in
these communities take for granted as part of their everyday experience...” Customary
laws are most often not written laws, and can thus be interpreted as norms and customs
in the community that people regard as so binding that they become laws. In such a
complex environment as in Ethiopia, where the federal law has limited power to influence
the regional laws, it is even more difficult to change the customary laws. Education may
be an important stepping stone in helping the law to diffuse into society. It will enable
women to gain knowledge about the law, give them the opportunity to learn to read the
law, and in the end give the people who need it the most an opportunity to use it.
Deyessa et al. (2010) focus on the norms and attitudes of women regarding violence against
women. They do a survey as part of the WHO study on women’s health and life events in
Butajira, a community 130 km. south of Addis Ababa. They find that women living in
rural areas, and those that are illiterate, were more likely to express attitudes that accept
violence against women. Interestingly they also find that literate rural women have a
higher chance of experiencing physical violence than their illiterate counterparts. The
paper suggests this is because these women have greater autonomy, and are less likely
to accept the traditional role of rural women. This will then be a reason for violence
and chastisement in communities where the traditional gender roles are more prevalent.
Literate urban women with a literate spouse were the least likely to have experienced
physical violence, while the rural literate woman with an illiterate spouse was most likely
to have experienced physical violence. This shows that it is difficult for women to improve
their autonomy, as the general level of education needs to increase in the whole of society,
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also for men.
3 Ethiopia
As explained in Thomson (2010), the Berlin conference was arranged in 1884-1885 and is
part of what is called the scramble for Africa. The continent was carved up arbitrarily
between the European powers. With no notion of ethnicities and groups, they divided
the continent into countries, more concerned about which rivers and other resources that
were included than the people living in them. This created many social problems, as
many different ethnicities were gathered under what was supposed to be one state admin-
istration. Another destabilizing factor was that ethnic groups were split across borders.
The Somali people were suddenly divided between five states: British Somaliland, Ital-
ian Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopia and Kenya. This cumulated and resulted
in Somalia unsuccessfully going to war against Ethiopia in 1977-1978 trying to win the
Ogaden where many Somali were residing and even today it is still a chaotic area.
As stated in The World Factbook (CIA), Ethiopia is one of few African countries that
were never colonized, though it was occupied by Italy for a short period in 1936-1941. It
consists of 91,000,000 inhabitants spread over 80 different ethnicities, each with their own
languages. The largest groups are the Amhara and the Omoro covering more than 60% of
the population. The capital is Addis Ababa with a 2.8 million population. The country
is divided in 9 ethnically divided states and two self governing administrations. The
eastern and southwest parts of Ethiopia are dominated by Muslims, while the northern,
southeastern and central parts are predominantly Christians (Yirga et al. 2012).
The border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia lasted for two years, from 1998 to 2000.
Eritrea was awarded disputed area by an independent commission, but Ethiopia did not
accept it (Human Rights Watch 2013). By The World Factbook (CIA) it is estimated
that there are around 200,000-300,000 internally displaced persons in Ethiopia because of
the border war, ethnic clashes in Gambela and the Ethiopian military counterinsurgency
in the Somali region. Ethiopia also houses around 500,000 refugees from Somalia, Eritrea
and Sudan. The country got its own constitution in 1994 and it gives the state ownership
of all land, providing long term leases to tenants. However, land use certificates are now
being issued so that tenants get more rights to continue their occupancy and make more
efforts to improve their leaseholds.
The Human Rights Watch (2013) reports that the human rights records for Ethiopia have
deteriorated severely for the past couple of years. After the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation
(2009) was introduced, it has been used to convict journalists and opposition members.
The freedom of the press has forcefully been removed, closing down production of many
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magazines and newspapers.
3.1 Economy
The World Factbook (CIA) reports that adjusted for purchasing power parity and stated
in 2012 US dollars, GDP for 2012 is estimated to be $103.1 billion. This is divided
between the agricultural, industrial and service sectors, with agriculture contributing
with the largest share. This gives a GDP per capita of $1,200. For sake of comparison,
Norway has a GDP per capita of $55,300, Sudan $2,400 and Eritrea $800. The estimated
inflation rate for 2012 is 21.7% with a decrease from 33% in 2011. Its natural resources
consist of small reserves of gold, platinum, copper, potash, natural gas and hydro-power.
85% of total employment is in agriculture, accounting for 46% of GDP. The goods that
Ethiopia exports are coffee, khat, gold, leather products, live animals, oilseeds, while it
imports food and live animals, petroleum and petroleum products, chemicals, machinery,
motor vehicles, cereals and textiles.
3.2 Women’s status
Early marriage is common, and although the Revised Family Code sets the minimum age
for marriage to 18 years, this is not followed. Figure 1 shows that there has been an
increase in the age of first marriage or union, but still the average is below the minimum
of 18 years.
Figure 1: Age at first cohabitation
In the DHS 2011 survey 72% of the women answered they were living with a male head of
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household. Of the 16,515 women, 58% answered that they could not read at all. For 70%,
wood was the cooking fuel. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is still widely practised in
Ethiopia. Yirga et al. (2012) state that 80% of women of child bearing age have undergone
FGM. There are however large variations across regions with a prevalence of 27.1% in the
Gambella region and 99.7% in the Somali region. They conduct surveys in the Oromia
region, finding that the main reason for performing FGM was to reduce sexuality both
before marriage, and after to reduce the chance of committing adultery. Even though the
practice brings large physical and mental suffering and distress, few had tried to stop the
practice. Female genital mutilation is a big problem in the world, especially prevalent in
African countries. In order to increase women’s status and well-being, this practice has
to be stopped.
4 The Law Change
The Revised Family Code (2000) came into effect the 4th of July. In Hallward-Driemeier
& Gajigo (2010), the identification strategy relies on the fact that not all the regions
implemented the law at the same time. Between 2000 and 2005 some regions imple-
mented the law change, these were: Addis Ababa, Amhara, Dire Dawa, Oromiya and
Tigray. The regions that did not implement it before 2005, but have in 2011 are: Afar,
Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s
Region (SNNP). This is what Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo (2010) state, not specifying
which group the Somali region belongs to. The paper by Kumar & Quisumbing (2012)
also uses Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo (2010) as a source for this fact.
Other sources have not been found on which regions implemented the law change at which
time. There is not just one family law incorporated under the Ethiopian legal system.
One must consider the FDRE Constitution, regional constitutions, the Revised Family
Code of the FDRE and other regional family laws (Ashagrie & Belete 2009). Family law is
decided regionally, meaning that each region can enact its own family law. Tigray, Addis
Ababa, Dire Dawa, Oromia, Amhara and the SNNP were in the final stages of drafting
family law codes according to an article by Frances Olsen in Uhlig (2006). According
to The African Child Policy Forum (2012) the Revised Family Code is applicable only
in the two federal city administrations Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. In the Atlas of
Gender and Development report by the OECD (2010) they state that the effect of the
new family code has been limited due to the Constitution giving full sovereignty to the
regions. It documents that seven out of nine regions have their own family law and that
six of these continue with the previous law. They do however not specify which regions
that are concerned.
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Also according to Assefa (2008) there was done extensive work trying to get a uniform
family code that could apply to the country as a whole, but this was never realized.
The implementation was thus limited to the chartered cities of Addis Ababa and Dire
Dawa. Because different sources say different things, the analysis will be done using the
first specification from Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo (2010) followed with a sample only
including the chartered cities, to see if there was an effect present there.
Summaries of meetings by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (2002) show that they wish for all states to implement the law, and that the new
Family Code came into effect at the federal level. Below is a quote from the document
which shows how the new Family Code came about:
”During 2000-2001, the government machinery on women, in collaboration
with the non-governmental agencies, have been examining the discriminatory
aspect of the existing Family Code. Based on their findings, they proposed
measures to remove the discrimination and inequality and establish women’s
legal equality with men in the Family Code. The Ethiopian Women’s Lawyers
Association undertook studies on the violation of women’s rights in different
regions of the country. Their findings provided input in organizing arguments
in favour of women. WAO lobbied the lawmakers and different agencies to
ensure revision of the discriminatory laws. The unrelenting effort of the col-
laborative forces resulted in the new and revised Family Code based on the
principle of gender equality. The new Family Code came into effect in early
2001 at the federal level.”
The revised family law is not perfect. As mentioned in Yigzaw et al. (2010), it is an issue
that there is no mention of marital rape. In the DHS 2011 data only 53% of the women
say that they can refuse to have sex with their partner, and 51% say they can not ask
their partner to use a condom. This shows that women have limited control over their
sexual life and their own body.
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Figure 2: Implementation according to Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo (2010)
The new family law increased the minimum marriage age from 15 to 18, it made sure
that common property was administered jointly by the spouses, and divorce by mutual
consent was permitted (Prime Minister Office 2004).
In the preamble, the Revised Family Code states that:
WHEREAS, it has become essential to make the existing Ethiopian family
law in accordance with the socio-economic development of the society and,
above all, with the Constitution of the country, and, in particular, realizing
that marriage shall be based on the free consent of the spouses, and that it
is necessary to provide the legal basis which guarantees the equality of the
spouses-during the conclusion, duration and dissolution of marriage;
This gives some background to why the new law was introduced, also revealing that there
probably was a preceding common trend in the norms towards more equality between
spouses. In order to make sure this is not driving the results, this is controlled for in the
estimations by using a difference-in-difference approach.
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The identification strategy hinges on that there is nothing else happening in what we
define as the implementing regions that differs systematically from the regions we define
as non-implementing, except for the law change. A national report from Prime Minister
Office (2004), mentions several law changes and programs which are implemented which
may make a causal interpretation problematic. In addition, it may take some time for
these programs to have an effect, introducing a lag causing the maximum effect to take
place several years after the implementation. This was seen in the paper from Stevenson
& Wolfers (2006). Here the maximum effect on female suicide was seen 15-20 years after
the implementation of unilateral divorce laws. If in general there is a lag in effects of law
changes, depending on the magnitude of this lag, laws implemented before the revised
family law of 2000 can affect the outcome variables we measure. This is a part of the
time variant variables that may cause some concern for our identification strategy for
measuring the exact effect of a law change.
In table 1 follows an overview of measures taken to improve women’s status in society.
Those introduced between 2000 and 2011 may have a confounding effect on the outcomes
measured in the estimations that follow. Those introduced before 2000 may also be a
confounding factor if their effect changes over time.
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Table 1: Measures taken to improve women’s autonomy
Name of initiative Year Main aim
Convention on Elimination of
all forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW)
Guarantees women equal right and protection from
discrimination
Convention of Civil and Po-
litical Rights
Convention on Economic and
Social and Cultural Rights
The Child Right Convention
Millenium Development
Goals
National Policy on Ethiopian
Women
1993 Facilitating conditions for the speeding of equality
between men and women
Education and training policy 1994 Financial support from the government to raise the
participation of women in education.
Constitution 1995 Guaranteed women the right to acquire, administer,
control, use and transfer property including land.
Federal Rural Land Admin-
istration Proclamation no
89/1997
1997 Land administration law of a region shall confirm the
equal rights of women in respect of the use, admin-
stration and control of land as well as in respect of
transferred and bequeathed holding rights.
Ethiopia Environment Policy 1997 Ensures full participation of women in environmen-
tal decision making, resource ownership and manage-
ment.
Education Sector Develop-
ment Program (ESDP)
1997/98-2001/03 Putting the Education and training policy into ac-
tion
National policy on
HIV/AIDS
1998 Recognizes gender inequality and socio-economic dis-
empowerment of women as one of the root causes for
the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Ethiopian Health Sector Re-
form Development Program
(HSDP)
1998 Focus on health needs of women and children.
Campaign for eradication of
polio
1999
Revised Family Code July 2000
Women’s Development Initia-
tive Project (WDIP)
May 2001 Aims to test methodologies to enhance the social and
economic welfare of poor households.
Sustainable Development and
Poverty Reducation Program
(SDPRP)
2002 Continue poverty reduction program activities in the
country.
Education Sector Develop-
ment Program II (ESDP II)
2002/03-2004/05
National Coalition for
Women Against HIV/AIDS
June 2003 Promote movement to make HIV/AIDS, poverty and
harmful traditional practices a thing of the past
Project to organize and give
retrenched women skill train-
ing
In effect in 2004 Between 1996 and 2004 many women workers lost
their jobs due to privatization
Source: Prime Minister Office (2004)
In addition, various awareness creation programs are undertaken by the government in-
cluding judges, prosecutors, polices, women and school representatitves of all regions.
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5 The Data
The data used is from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) collected in Ethiopia
in 2000, 2005 and 2011. The DHS are nationally representative household surveys cov-
ering topics of interest for this paper including household and respondent characteristics,
women’s decision making power, education and employment. Fieldwork for the DHS 2000
was conducted between February and June, while the Revised Family Code came into ef-
fect the 4th of July 2000. The data for the 2000 study was thus collected just before the
law was implemented.
In the DHS from 2000, 14% of the married women were in a polygonous union and
80% of all women were circumcised. The questionnaires were developed in the English
language and translated into the five principal languages in use in the country: Amarigna,
Oromigna, Tigrigna, Somaligna, and Afarigna.
5.1 Data and Analysis software
Data for making the map are from the Global Administrative Areas website (GADM
2012), and the survey data are from the Demographic and Health Surveys DHS (2000,
2005, 2011a). The male and female datasets are used in the analysis. The survey
data is analyzed using STATA (2011) for Windows and the map is created with ArcGIS
(2008).
Table 2: Sample sizes
Unit 2000 2005 2011
Households 14,072 13,721 16,702
Women Age: 15 to 49 15,367 14,070 16,515
Married women 9380 8644 10,204
Men Age: 15 to 59 2607 6033 14,110
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Observations 2000 2005 2011
Tigray 1,306 1,257 1,728
Affar 858 789 1,291
Amhara 1,909 1,943 2,087
Oromiya 2,578 2,230 2,135
Somali 844 669 914
Benishangul-Gumuz 992 846 1,259
SNNP 2,028 2,087 2,034
Gambela 876 729 1,130
Harari 908 844 1,101
Addis Ababa 2,015 1,869 1,741
Dire Dawa 1,053 807 1,095
Total 15,367 14,070 16,515
Age
15-19 3,584 3,252 3,835
20-24 2,844 2,617 3,022
25-29 2,716 2,557 3,185
30-34 1,902 1,754 2,100
35-39 1,762 1,629 1,958
40-44 1,324 1,181 1,314
45-49 1,235 1,080 1,101
Education
Urban 5.5 6.4 6.7
Rural 0.5 0.9 1.6
Difference(U-R) 5 5.5 5.1
Tigray 0.85 2.00 2.96
Affar 0.68 0.72 1.22
Amhara 0.75 1.40 2.12
Oromiya 0.98 1.68 2.79
Somali 0.43 0.52 1.11
Benishangul-Gumuz 0.81 1.50 2.18
SNNP 1.08 1.66 2.54
Gambela 1.50 2.07 3.48
Harari 3.53 4.70 5.42
Addis Ababa 6.40 7.23 7.65
Dire Dawa 3.77 4.35 4.60
Occupations
Not working 5,860 9,121 7,990
Prof., tech., manag. 186 300 361
Clerical 186 121 338
Sales 2,358 2,001 2,899
Agriculture self employed 2,181 - -
Agriculture employee 2,824 1,822 3,143
Services 255 25 283
Skilled manual 1,216 322 1,205
Unskilled manual 282 311 141
Other 9 47 155
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Education shows the average education in single years, and is decomposed into rural and
urban populations and regions. On average, women in the urban areas have 5.2 more
years of education than the rural women.
6 Methodology
As explained in Puhani (2012), difference-in-difference estimation is one of the most im-
portant identification strategies in applied economics. Using the difference-in-difference
method as identification strategy we assume that in the absence of intervention, the treat-
ment and control groups would have common trends. Because we have repeated cross
sections and not panel data, we also need to assume that the composition of treatment
and control groups do not change over time.
We look at the difference between the treated and non-treated groups after the treatment,
and subtract any differences that were present before the treatment. This is graphically
represented in figure 3.
Eect of the law change
Treated regions
Non-treated regions
Y
TimeLaw implemented
Figure 3: The difference-in-difference method
As discussed in Bertrand et al. (2004), the difference-in-difference estimation technique is
appropriate when the intervention is as good as random, conditional on group and time
fixed effects.
It is crucial for our identification strategy to assume that the trends in the regions which
implemented the law first would be the same as the regions which did not implement
the law, absent the implementation. There can not be any other factor common for
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the implementing region which does not hold for the non-implementing regions. As an
example it is very likely that the urban regions would implement the law first. They may
have more female-friendly norms in these regions, causing them to have a steeper trend
in e.g. labor opportunities for women. This will not be a problem in the difference-in-
difference setup if the trends are present before the law change, as time invariant factors
are subtracted from the effect measurement.
It is possible to control for unit fixed effects when looking at the difference between periods.
Unobserved variables which do not change over time are then no longer a concern. Things
that do not change over time, like gender or geographic distances, are unlikely to have an
explanatory role in the changing dependent variable.
Ideally, there should be data for a longer time period, allowing us to identify whether the
trends are linear or not. As discussed by Finseraas & Kotsadam (2013), if you assume the
trends are linear while they in fact are non-linear, there is a risk of estimating a treatment
effect which does not exist. Including polynomials one can check for this. Placebo analyses
by placing a fake treatment may also be able to identify whether there is an underlying
trend causing the estimates to be significant, or whether there is an actual effect of the
treatment. In this thesis I will run regressions using dependent variables that are not
thought to be affected by the law change as a placebo analysis.
It is possible to conduct a difference-in-difference study in several ways. One is by actually
calculating the differences between averages in the treatment and control groups before
and after the law change. By subtracting one difference from the other the effect is
calculated, free from the year and regional trends. In the following analysis, I will use a
regression setup for the difference-in-difference, which will give the exact same estimate
for the effect.
Following the Wooldridge (2010) setup for a simple difference-in-differences equation, we
call A the control group, and B the treatment group. The control group will be the
regions that did not implement the law, and the treatment group will be those that did.
Dummy variables are included for treatment and year, called dB and d2 respectively. The
equation to evaluate the impact of the policy change will then look like this:
y = β0 + β1dB + δ0d2 + δ1d2 ∗ dB + u (1)
dB will capture differences between the groups before the policy change, and d2 will
capture those trends that would have changed the dependent variable even if the policy
change was not introduced. The coefficient in front of the interaction term δ1 is the effect
we are interested in as the interaction term is equal to one for the treated group in period
2. Fixed effects across regions, common factors varying over time and regional differences
that vary linearly over time are all removed from the estimate of δ1.
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The OLS estimator δˆ1 can be interpreted by introducing some more variables. Let y¯A,1
denote sample average of y for the control group in period 1, y¯A,2 the control group in
period 2. The same interpretation goes for y¯B,1 and y¯B,2, but applied to the treatment
group.
δˆ1 = (y¯B,2 − y¯B,1) − (y¯A,2 − y¯A,1) (2)
This is the same as the manual calculations described earlier, where one finds the averages
for four states that the groups can be in: treated group in period 1, treated group in period
2, control group in period 1 and control group in period 2. This is the preferred way to
estimate a change in the dependent variable, because we filter out the trends from our
effect. However, we can never be sure that there is not something else influencing and
changing the dependent variable in the time period we are looking at. One has to carefully
search for other time varying factors that may have changed. If these are observable it is
possible to control for them as well.
For the difference-in-difference estimations to be correct we need to make a few assump-
tions. The model is assumed to be correctly specified, and the additive structure needs to
be correct. The error term u needs to be zero on average, and it needs to be uncorrelated
with the other variables in the equation. This is summarized like this:
E[i] = 0
cov(i, Ti) = 0
cov(i, ti) = 0
cov(i, Ti ∗ ti) = 0
If any of these assumptions do no hold, there is no certainty about the δ1’s unbiased-
ness.
In this study there will be focus on the trends in two goal indicators, education length
and norms regarding violence in order to see the effect the law change has had on the
situation for women.
6.1 Limitations
As discussed above, the identification strategy hinges on the assumption that the trends
would have been the same in the treated group as in the non-treated group if they had not
been treated. Time variant differences that could occur are natural disasters like floods
or droughts, there could be areas with conflict, or some regions may have been influenced
by campaigns on their regional TV channels. We can only measure the intention to treat
(ITT), as we cannot control for these factors that may enhance or diminish the effect
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of the law change. Some of the time variant factors might even be a direct reaction to
the law change. For example groups may form who are against these changes, who will
impose even more conservative customary laws than before. The ITT is based on the
initial treatment assignment. Whether or not the individuals will be treated could be
manipulated by the subjects themselves. Assuming that the individuals are fully mobile,
and hostile against the law changes, imposing the new law also could cause them to move
to another region where the law is not in effect, changing the composition of the samples
between 2000 and 2005.
Bertrand et al. (2004) address the serial correlation problem which can arise when using
many time periods resulting in under-stated standard errors. One of their proposals to
avoid this is to aggregate the data into two periods: pre- and post-intervention. This is
however not a concern for this thesis as only two periods are used.
In Besley & Case (2000) they problematize the possible endogeneity of policy imple-
mentation. They emphasize that if policy making is a purposeful action, there may be
factors present causing the policy change in the treated areas, which will not be present
in the control areas. The control groups need to be stable and reflect the changes that
also influence the treatment groups in the same way in order for our estimates to be
unbiased.
7 Trends
Following below are the average trends, differed between the regions that implemented
the law and those who did not, following the implementation specification by Hallward-
Driemeier & Gajigo (2010). The implementing regions implement the law change between
2000 and 2005, while the non-implementing regions implement the law between 2005 and
2011. Ideally there would be data showing the trends before the law change, but this is
not available. The focus will therefore be on the slopes when both groups are under the
same conditions.
19
7.1 Age at first cohabitation
Figure 4: Age at first cohabitation for women in implementing and non-implementing regions
Figure 4 shows that the mean age of first cohabitation is lower in the implementing
regions than in the non-implementing regions. The slope for the implementing regions
between 2000 and 2005 is similar to the slope in the non-implementing regions between
2005 and 2011. This shows that the effect is similar when the law is introduced. It is
also interesting to note that the slope for the non-implementing regions between 2000 and
2005 is stable around 16.6 years, and first sees an increase when the law is introduced.
At this point, the implementing regions have been subject to the law for a longer time,
which may cause an even steeper trend.The trends seem to converge. It is however
surprising that the implementing regions show a lower age at first cohabitation than the
non-implementing regions, as it is thought that higher education would increase the age
at first cohabitation. As seen in figure 5, the implementing regions are more educated
than the non-implementing regions.
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7.2 Education
Figure 5: Education for women in treated and non-treated regions
As figure 5 shows, the trends in average education are parallel across implementing and
non-implementing regions. There does not seem to be a break in the trend for the regions
implementing the revised family law. When using the non-implementing regions as a
counterfactual in the difference-in-difference regressions it will probably not produce any
effect.
7.3 Norms
Figure 6: Norms for women in treated and non-treated regions
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Figure 6 depicts the time trend in norms where a yearly average is constructed, merging
the norm variables in the dataset. If the respondent answers that it is justifiable to
beat a wife in one of the situations presented, she is coded 0. If however the respondent
never answered that it was justifiable to beat a woman, she is coded as 1. An upwards
sloping graph is thus a good sign showing an improvement in norms. The implementing
regions have a quite linear trend from the moment the revised family code was introduced.
The non-implementing regions between 2000 and 2005 show no change until the 2011
survey when the average suddenly increases. This abrupt change occurring between 2005
and 2011 could be caused by the law being implemented in this period. When all the
regions have implemented the law they seem to follow the same upwards trend. Using the
non-implementing regions as a counterfactual between 2000 and 2005 may not be a bad
approximation.
These trends rest on data gathered at three points of time, connected by a linear line.
There could be large fluctuations in the years between, but these linear trends give us at
least an idea of the general trends.
8 Estimations
Data analysis was conducted using STATA and the 2000 and 2005 DHS datasets are used
to estimate regular difference-in-difference regressions.
8.1 Education
Below follow difference-in-difference estimations, only varying the dependent variable to
see whether there is any significant effect of the law change. It is thought that increasing
the age of marriage would give women more time to invest in their education, a hypothesis
discussed in Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo (2010).
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Table 4: Education and Literacy for women 2000 and 2005
Education Literacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D 0.565∗∗ 0.314∗ 1.144∗∗∗ 0.0234 -0.00440 0.0881∗∗
(2.87) (2.16) (4.10) (1.07) (-0.27) (2.84)
T 1.172∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(5.40) (3.75) (5.79) (5.65) (3.84) (6.19)
DT 0.170 0.0450 -0.0108 0.0190 0.00513 -0.00191
(0.51) (0.18) (-0.03) (0.55) (0.19) (-0.05)
cons 1.301∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 2.077∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(10.50) (9.96) (11.38) (11.83) (10.88) (13.03)
N 29437 17641 11796 29437 17641 11796
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4 shows the results from difference-in-difference estimations using the data from
2000 and 2005. The dependent variables are education in single years and literacy re-
spectively. Literacy is defined as being able to read a whole sentence without problems,
coded as 0 when the respondent is not literate, and 1 when she is literate. Regressions
(1) and (4) use the total sample of women, (2) and (5) are married women, while (3) and
(6) are non-married women. Non-married women includes those that have never been
married, those who are living together, the widowed, the divorced and those not living
together. As can be seen, none of the specifications show any significant change in the
DT variable, the effect of the law change on the dependent variable. The T dummy, with
the value of 1 for the regions implementing the law in 2005, is positive and significant
for all specifications, showing that there was a pre-existing higher level in education and
literacy for women in the implementing regions. This result is expected as it is thought
that the regions who already have more female autonomy would embrace the new laws
first. The D dummy has a value of 1 for data collected in 2005.
Dre`ze & Murthi (2001) find that literacy in their sample in India is driven by education,
and that there is not a joint influence by unobserved variables acting on both. This
seems reasonable as literacy is a main skill learned during the first years of education
and a prerequisite for further education. As education drives literacy, all the estimated
coefficients for literacy, though not significant, are systematically smaller than those for
education in table 4.
As seen by conducting a simple difference-in-difference estimation in table 5 using 2000
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and 2005 data with the age of first marriage as the dependent variable, there has been
no significant change that can be related to the law change. Thereby we cannot conclude
that the women have attained more education because of an increased age at marriage
that can be attributed to the law change. This also shows that the law of a minimum age
at marriage is not enforced.
Table 5: Change in age at first marriage
(1)
Age
D 0.0380 (0.51)
T -0.730∗∗∗ (-10.61)
DT 0.117 (1.17)
cons 16.57∗∗∗ (323.75)
N 21628
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
There does not seem to be an effect on education, but the education variable is included
in the following regressions focussing on norms to see if certain groups maybe show a
significant improvement.
8.2 Violence
Violence is defined by the World Health Organisation as:
”The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results
in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm,
maldevelopment or deprivation.” (Krug et al. 2002)
This definition puts emphasis on that violence is intentional, omitting accidents and
unfortunate incidents. It also includes self-abuse and suicide as these are acts of violence
against oneself.
The DHS surveys contain questions concerning the justifiability of wife beating. This has
its limitations as only a specific form of violence against married women is measured.
Also, this measures opinions, and not the actual use of violence.
Estimations are made to see whether there was a change in the norms regarding violence
against women, more specifically violence against wives. Dummy variables are created for
a range of different situations where the respondents were asked whether it was justifiable
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to beat a wife. These dummies serve as the dependent variables in the following situations:
if she goes out without telling him, if she neglects the children, if she argues with him, if
she refuses to have sex with him and if she burns the food. D is a time dummy, T is the
implementation dummy, and DT the treatment effect coefficient of interest.
Table 6: Dependent variables in estimations
Dependent variable =0 when it is justifiable to hit a woman when she:
out Goes out with telling the husband
child Neglects the children
argue Argues with the husband
nosex Refuses to have sex with the husband
burnfood Burns the food
violent Does one of the above
The dependent variable edu is not included in table 6 as it is not a dummy variable. It is
the average education in single years.
A higher percentage of women than men think it is justifiable to beat a wife in these
circumstances. Women with such views may think of herself as secondary to the man,
not standing up for her own needs and this will probably have negative health implications
for the children as well.
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8.3 Only women
Table 7: Change in education and norms, women 2000 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 0.565∗∗ -0.0576∗∗ -0.00415 0.0205 0.0421∗ 0.0810∗∗∗ -0.00240
(2.87) (-3.03) (-0.22) (1.10) (2.09) (3.96) (-0.16)
T 1.172∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗ 0.0467∗ 0.0428∗ 0.0744∗∗∗ 0.0815∗∗∗ 0.0351∗
(5.40) (3.17) (2.44) (2.06) (3.36) (3.77) (2.17)
DT 0.170 -0.000783 0.0330 0.0237 0.0520 -0.0250 0.0746∗∗
(0.51) (-0.03) (1.24) (0.80) (1.78) (-0.79) (3.06)
cons 1.301∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(10.50) (31.39) (25.40) (31.87) (31.88) (26.86) (17.14)
N 29437 29073 29098 28954 28051 29124 29274
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
From table 7 we see that the disaggregated norm variables show no significant change
because of the law change in the women’s answers from 2000 to 2005. Neither is there
a change in education. The variable violence however shows a significant increase from
period one to period two. Violence is constructed by aggregating the different situations.
When the respondent finds any of the situations justifiable for beating, it is coded as
0, when answering that it is not justifiable in any of the situations it is coded as 1.
The aggregation is explained by assuming that when the respondent answers that it is
justifiable in at least one of the situations to hit a woman, the respondent accepts violent
behaviour in some situations, whereas a respondent who does not find it acceptable to
hit a woman in any of the situations in the survey will be against all kinds of violence.
An aggregated variable is preferable because it is less prone to capturing noise. All the
coefficient for the regional trends (T) are significant, showing that there is a significant
difference in the dependent variable between the regions that implemented the law and
those who did not. The regressions will only include the T row for those regions where
T = 1, meaning the regions that implemented the law before 2005. In these regions
women answer significantly more often that it is not justifiable to beat a wife in all the
5 different situations. This supports the hypothesis that those regions that were more
female friendly would be the first ones to implement the laws. Through the difference-
in-difference equations we control for these differences between the control and treatment
group, and as we can see there is only a change in the norms of women in the aggregated
26
variable after the law change. For regressions (1), (2), (5) and (6) there is a significant
change in the time (D) dummy. This will take the value of 1 for all regions in the period
after the law change. This dummy accounts for any time trends that may be present.
There may be an improvement or worsening in norms over time not attributable to the
law change. Here we see that there are more women answering that it is justifiable to
beat a wife when she goes out without telling the husband in the period after the law
change. It is unclear why this is so. However, for the regressions where refusing sex and
burning food is the issue, there are more people answering that it is not justifiable after
the law change. The neglection of children and arguing with the husband regressions are
unchanged and not significantly different from 0.
8.4 Only men
Estimating the same regressions for only men in table 8 we see there is a significant im-
provement in the dependent variable for only one of the estimates, and the aggregated
variable is actually not significant. It may be even more important to change the norms
among the men who do the actual beating, so there is a large potential for improve-
ment.
Table 8: Change in education and norms, men 2000 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 0.737∗∗ 0.0687∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.0913∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(2.69) (2.66) (4.43) (3.61) (6.10) (4.90) (5.88)
T 0.983∗∗ 0.0182 0.000596 0.0329 0.0908∗∗ 0.0302 0.0788∗∗
(3.10) (0.66) (0.02) (1.18) (3.24) (1.08) (2.79)
DT 0.0576 0.0544 0.0957∗ 0.0381 0.0160 0.0388 0.0283
(0.13) (1.55) (2.58) (1.10) (0.46) (1.11) (0.74)
cons 2.646∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(13.74) (29.19) (25.38) (29.53) (26.09) (31.42) (14.96)
N 8640 8510 8439 8498 8369 8505 8558
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
There was an improvement that can be attributed to the law change, regarding the neglec-
tion of children. Significantly fewer men found it justifiable to beat a wife if she neglected
the children after the law change than before. The responses on the other situations are
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however not significantly different from 0. Also, in contrast to the female data sample,
there is no preceding regional trend. This means that in the sample of men the regions
that did implement the law did not differ systematically from those that did not. This is
true for all equations except number (1), (5) and (7). The implementing regions seem to
be more inclined to answering that it is not justifiable to hit a woman if she refuses the
husband sex, in the aggregated variable, and it also seems like the implementing regions
have higher education than the non-implementing.
8.5 Men and women
Table 9: Change in education and norms, men and women 2000 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 0.756∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0171 0.00679 0.0375 0.0610∗∗ -0.0109
(3.79) (-3.59) (-0.92) (0.37) (1.89) (3.02) (-0.72)
T 1.154∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗ 0.0419∗ 0.0407∗ 0.0752∗∗∗ 0.0757∗∗∗ 0.0375∗
(5.28) (3.04) (2.25) (2.01) (3.51) (3.60) (2.32)
DT 0.134 0.00360 0.0377 0.0258 0.0511 -0.0192 0.0722∗∗
(0.40) (0.13) (1.43) (0.89) (1.77) (-0.61) (2.95)
cons 1.378∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(11.08) (33.16) (27.12) (34.18) (33.38) (29.24) (18.19)
N 82881 60728 60787 60499 58668 60837 61148
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
When combining the men and women’s datasets we see a significant change in the aggre-
gated variable violent. There is no change in years of education that can be attributed to
the law change, and none of the disaggregated norm regressions show any change.
8.6 Only married women 2000 and 2005
As married women are the target group directly affected by the law change, it is reasonable
they were affected the most by the law change.
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Table 10: Change in education and norms, married women 2000 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 0.314∗ -0.0757∗∗∗ -0.0123 0.0108 0.0431∗ 0.0708∗∗∗ -0.0100
(2.16) (-3.87) (-0.62) (0.60) (2.04) (3.44) (-0.70)
T 0.607∗∗∗ 0.0189 0.0193 -0.0000358 0.0349 0.0251 0.00148
(3.75) (0.94) (0.99) (-0.00) (1.60) (1.21) (0.10)
DT 0.0450 -0.00781 0.0144 0.0172 0.0464 -0.0344 0.0556∗
(0.18) (-0.28) (0.54) (0.62) (1.59) (-1.16) (2.57)
cons 0.899∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(9.96) (29.91) (23.82) (29.87) (29.20) (27.04) (16.58)
N 17641 17510 17508 17429 17151 17519 17595
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 10 shows that there is a significant effect that can be attributed to the law change
when looking at the aggregated norm variable violent. The other variables are not signif-
icant.
8.7 Non-married women 2000 and 2005
There may be an effect through changing opportunities for women, this may be an effect
seen best for the women who are not married. Because the minimum age of marriage was
raised from 15 to 18, it is thought there is an effect causing women to get more education
before getting married. The sample used are all the other categories: those never married,
living together, widowed, divorced and not living together.
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Table 11: Change in education for non-married women 2000 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 1.144∗∗∗ -0.0172 0.0155 0.0443 0.0434 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0163
(4.10) (-0.70) (0.64) (1.71) (1.78) (3.85) (0.75)
T 1.600∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0688∗∗ 0.0789∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.0641∗∗
(5.79) (4.57) (2.96) (3.14) (3.98) (5.45) (3.04)
DT -0.0108 -0.0143 0.0432 0.0155 0.0503 -0.0290 0.0851∗∗
(-0.03) (-0.41) (1.33) (0.43) (1.49) (-0.76) (2.71)
cons 2.077∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(11.38) (26.34) (21.46) (26.26) (29.46) (20.84) (14.10)
N 11796 11563 11590 11525 10900 11605 11679
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 11 shows an effect on the non-married women for the aggregated variable. This
shows support for the hypothesis that women not directly affected see a change in norms
because they are influenced by the rest of society and because they have a stronger future
bargaining power. The education variable however does not see a significant change.
The change is larger for the non-married women with a coefficient of 0.0851 than the
married women with a coefficient of 0.0556. Their confidence intervals do not overlap
as the standard errors are of about the same size. Women who are married when the
law changes have lived longer under the old regime and may have had to justify their
husband’s violent behaviour for so long that they believe it is the only way to live. This is
a phenomenon called adaptive preferences as explained in Nussbaum (2001). Individuals
adjust their preferences and thereby their desires to be content with the life they have.
Instead of wanting something that is not attainable, they accept the current state and
are content with that, not striving for something else. This emphasizes the difficulty
in measuring women’s well-being, their subjective answers will be influenced by their
culture and whether they have accepted their position in life or not. Nussbaum (2001)
also mentions a study done by Amartya Sen on data from an area near Calcutta in India.
When widows and widowers were asked about their health status among half of the men
answered that they were ill, while only 2.5% of the widows answered the same. In reality
the widows were far worse off, both in nutritional and health status. Sen concludes that
the widows have accepted their deprivation and do not expect anything better. This
theory could explain the larger increase in non-married women answering that it is not
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acceptable to hit a wife, even though they are not directly affected by the law change.
8.8 Household bargaining power
To see whether there has been an improvement in women’s autonomy, the data on who
decides how to spend money is used. A dummy variable was created for the variables
showing who makes decisions in the household. The five original categories on who makes
decisions in the household were: Respondent alone; respondent and husband/partner;
respondent and other person; husband/partner alone; someone else. As the scope is to
find out whether female agency increased, the first three categories where the woman is
at least part of the decision making process, is coded as 1, while the other two where she
is not involved is 0. The missing values and those coded not applicable where dropped.
The coefficient would thus be positive if there was an improvement.
Table 12: Change in decision making women 2000 and 2005
(1)
decision
D -0.203∗∗∗ (-12.89)
T -0.00714 (-0.36)
DT 0.000789 (0.04)
cons 0.283∗∗∗ (18.88)
N 29437
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The effect is not significant as seen in table 12. This does however not mean that the
effect of the law change on the aggregated norm variable is not driven by changes in
household bargaining power. The increased bargaining power may work through other
channels than decision making. As mentioned in the literature review increased bargaining
power may increase the woman’s nutrient intake and lower the probability of her being
underweight.
8.9 The chartered cities
There may be an explanation for the lack of measurable effect, looking at the division of
legislative power in the country.
Email correspondence with Abrham Yohannes who is a lecturer at the College of Law,
Haramaya University and a lawyer licensed to practice law at all levels of Federal Courts
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and Harari Regional Courts, revealed that all the regional states have their own regional
family law. The revised family law has never been implemented in the regions as the
law is a federal law not applicable on regional states. Also the report by The African
Child Policy Forum (2012) mentions the challenges due to the constitutional division of
powers, reporting that the revised family code is implemented only in Dire Dawa and
Addis Ababa which are the two federal city administrations. The regions may have been
influenced, changing their own family laws according to the federal law, but these may
follow by parts or as a whole.
Because of conflicting sources about where the laws were implemented and not, the fol-
lowing estimations only treat the chartered cities Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa as regions
which implemented the law. Thus all the other regions will be coded as not having im-
plemented the law, introducing the underlying trend which will be subtracted to get the
effect of the law change alone.
Table 13: Married women 2000 and 2005 in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 1.321∗∗∗ -0.0503∗∗ 0.00531 0.0436∗ 0.0705∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗ 0.0308∗
(6.71) (-2.83) (0.30) (2.41) (4.12) (3.36) (2.03)
T 4.233∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(18.74) (11.25) (9.19) (13.11) (12.73) (14.21) (11.55)
DT -0.523 0.0794∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0370 0.0178 0.0727∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(-1.58) (2.70) (4.52) (1.33) (0.66) (2.56) (4.78)
cons 1.786∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(14.12) (37.60) (30.13) (34.30) (41.02) (30.37) (19.20)
N 11796 11563 11590 11525 10900 11605 11679
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In table 13 we see that there are actual improvements in three of the disaggregated
in addition to the aggregated variables showing the justifiability of beating. There is
a regional difference between the chartered cities and all other regions as seen by the
coefficients on the T (Treated=1) coefficients.
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8.10 Robustness
If, however, some of the other regions did implement the law, being in the counterfactual
group would erase some of the effect which was actually contributed by the law change. In
the following estimates will be made for married women in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa,
using Somali as the control region. Somali is chosen because there has been no source
citing that the law was implemented in Somali, in addition it borders to Dire Dawa.
Thus the chartered cities will be coded as treated, and Somali will be the control group.
The rest of the regions will be coded as missing data, for both the T (treatment) and D
(period) dummies.
Table 14: Married women 2000 and 2005 in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa with Somali as
counterfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 0.198 -0.0394 -0.0331 0.136∗ 0.0580 0.00705 0.0206
(0.33) (-0.67) (-0.52) (2.19) (1.02) (0.13) (0.46)
T 5.152∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(11.49) (8.09) (4.41) (8.40) (8.37) (5.90) (7.15)
DT 0.599 0.0685 0.163∗ -0.0557 0.0303 0.130∗ 0.144∗∗
(0.91) (1.06) (2.42) (-0.83) (0.50) (2.15) (2.81)
cons 0.867∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(2.13) (10.76) (9.03) (10.29) (12.00) (13.84) (5.03)
N 4117 4076 4079 4060 3892 4068 4096
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 14 shows that, resting on the assumption that Somali would be a good counterfac-
tual for the chartered cities, there was a significant improvement in two of the aspects
and in the aggregated variable. To check for its robustness, the results are repeated using
different regions as the counterfactuals.
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Table 15: Married women 2000 and 2005 in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa with Afar as coun-
terfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 1.093∗∗∗ 0.0315 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0470 0.0839∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(3.34) (0.94) (4.85) (1.26) (2.21) (4.08) (3.77)
T 4.407∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(14.20) (10.36) (13.18) (9.75) (9.87) (15.48) (12.89)
DT -0.295 -0.00237 -0.0227 0.0336 0.00443 -0.0107 0.0604
(-0.66) (-0.06) (-0.59) (0.79) (0.10) (-0.25) (1.64)
cons 1.612∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(6.52) (16.04) (14.45) (14.54) (15.57) (11.39) (7.97)
N 5142 5093 5097 5069 4790 5090 5120
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
As seen in table 15, suddenly there is no effect of the law using Afar as the counterfactual
region. This suggests that Afar may have implemented the same family law as the char-
tered cities, although Afar is one of the non-implementing regions in Hallward-Driemeier
& Gajigo (2010).
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Table 16: Married women 2000 and 2005 in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa with Benishangul-
Gumuz as counterfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 1.587∗∗ 0.00286 -0.0304 0.0223 0.0300 0.0889 -0.00221
(2.95) (0.06) (-0.49) (0.50) (0.68) (1.63) (-0.05)
T 4.589∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(13.67) (6.51) (3.93) (6.62) (6.83) (8.83) (7.75)
DT -0.790 0.0263 0.160∗ 0.0583 0.0583 0.0482 0.167∗∗∗
(-1.33) (0.46) (2.43) (1.20) (1.19) (0.83) (3.41)
cons 1.431∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(5.14) (11.98) (8.43) (12.83) (15.41) (8.44) (6.09)
N 4189 4150 4154 4132 3936 4147 4175
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 16 shows that the aggregated variable violent is significantly different from 0, and
also regression number (3) concerning neglection of the children has a significant in-
crease.
Table 17: Married women 2000 and 2005 in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa with Gambella as
counterfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 0.773 0.0522 0.00855 0.0795 -0.0973 0.143∗ 0.0672
(1.62) (1.04) (0.12) (1.27) (-1.61) (2.21) (1.37)
T 3.754∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.105 0.243∗∗∗ 0.123∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(10.32) (7.06) (1.82) (4.79) (2.41) (6.81) (5.73)
DT 0.0243 -0.0231 0.122 0.00108 0.186∗∗ -0.00624 0.0973
(0.05) (-0.42) (1.67) (0.02) (2.88) (-0.09) (1.82)
cons 2.265∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(7.27) (13.00) (8.25) (9.96) (14.36) (8.11) (5.28)
N 4162 4125 4130 4115 3928 4123 4152
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Using Gambella as the counterfactual for the chartered cities in table 17 we see that the
aggregated variable violent is not significant. Regression number (5), however shows a
significant effect.
Table 18: Married women 2000 and 2005 in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa with Harari as
counterfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 1.709∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.0702 -0.0476 0.000132 -0.170∗∗∗
(2.42) (-5.04) (-4.77) (-1.51) (-1.42) (0.00) (-3.78)
T 1.611∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.0441 -0.0211 -0.0435 -0.110∗∗∗
(2.88) (-4.12) (-4.44) (-1.55) (-0.87) (-1.42) (-3.68)
DT -0.912 0.265∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(-1.21) (5.02) (6.84) (2.88) (3.47) (3.00) (6.50)
cons 4.408∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(8.38) (43.78) (27.39) (33.96) (48.91) (29.20) (20.82)
N 4482 4445 4447 4423 4225 4441 4469
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 18 using Harari as the counterfactual shows a significant positive effect of the
law change for all the regressions, except the one with single years of education as the
dependent variable.
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Table 19: Married women 2000 and 2005 in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa with SNNP as
counterfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu out child argue nosex burnfood violent
D 1.093∗∗∗ 0.0315 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0470 0.0839∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(3.34) (0.94) (4.85) (1.26) (2.21) (4.08) (3.77)
T 4.407∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(14.20) (10.36) (13.18) (9.75) (9.87) (15.48) (12.89)
DT -0.295 -0.00237 -0.0227 0.0336 0.00443 -0.0107 0.0604
(-0.66) (-0.06) (-0.59) (0.79) (0.10) (-0.25) (1.64)
cons 1.612∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(6.52) (16.04) (14.45) (14.54) (15.57) (11.39) (7.97)
N 5142 5093 5097 5069 4790 5090 5120
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 19 shows no significant effect of the law change in any of the regressions.
Repeating the estimates, using the rest of the non-implementing regions one by one as
postulated in Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo (2010), we see large variations in the effects.
The effect on the aggregated variable violent by using Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz or
Somali as the counterfactual is significant. Conversely, using the SNNP, Gambela and Afar
regions show no significant changes. This can be explained in several different ways.
1. The specification of the implementation of the law is wrong. By using as a counter-
factual a region that also has enacted the law, we do not get a means for comparison
and get no effect.
2. Other things may interfere. Even though the region used as counterfactual may not
have implemented the law, it may have enacted other types of laws. This may lead
to an under- or an overestimation of the effect of the family law. Also campaigns
and programmes may influence the way people respond.
3. The trends may not be linear between the regions. The effect will then be under-
or overestimated.
In table 20 dependent variables are used that are not assumed to be directly affected by
the law change. It is whether the household has electricity, radio, television, car or a
phone. The estimation with the phone shows that there has been an increase in phones
in the households that is attributed to the law change. One possibility is that increasing
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the bargaining power for women, given that they have a preference for phones, they will
use their increased power in the household to acquire one. On the other hand, this could
be a sign that the equation is misspecified, and that there are other confounding effects
that are not controlled for.
Table 20: Married women 2000 and 2005 change in appliances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
el radio tele car phone
D 0.0668∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗ 0.00266 0.0405∗∗∗
(2.10) (4.98) (3.23) (1.21) (3.60)
T 0.228∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0834∗∗∗
(6.46) (4.90) (6.68) (5.00) (6.66)
DT -0.0459 0.00468 0.0357 -0.00194 0.0505∗
(-0.89) (0.12) (1.13) (-0.25) (1.98)
cons 0.134∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.00384∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
(6.67) (15.69) (4.49) (3.06) (4.07)
N 28469 28470 28472 28475 28465
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
9 Conclusion
This thesis looks closer at a specific family law change in Ethiopia in 2000 to see whether
it had an effect on education and norms. Evaluating the effect of the policy change
using a difference-in-difference approach it is possible to remove the general trends and
only measure the effect of the law change. I have used education and attitudes towards
violence against women as the outcomes to be measured.
Ethiopia is a diverse country housing 91 million people belonging to 80 different ethnic-
ities. Introducing a uniform family law is difficult because of large cultural differences,
and the Constitution gives every region the power to form their own family laws. The
specification of which regions implemented the law when comes from Hallward-Driemeier
& Gajigo (2010). The difference-in-difference strategy relies on there not being systematic
differences between the implementing and non-implementing regions except for the law
change. There is also a risk that there are other laws implemented at the same time which
may affect the same outcome variables, distorting the effect of the family law change that
I wish to measure.
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Using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys from Ethiopia in 2000 and 2005,
difference-in-difference regressions are estimated in order to measure the effect of the law
change and subtracting the underlying trends. Different samples are used, women, men,
married and single in order to see if the effect is different for each of these groups. It is
thought that the family law change has the largest effect on married women as they are
the only ones directly affected. Through increasing the age of marriage and increasing
the future bargaining power the effect may extend to single women as well. I find there
is a larger effect for non-married women than for married women on the aggregated
norm variable, and this may be explained by adaptive preferences. The married women
may have accepted violent behavior from their husband, and adjusted their preferences
thereafter, whereas the single women have not done so yet.
An aggregated variable is created and named violent, taking the value of 0 if the respon-
dent answers that it is justifiable to beat a wife in any of the situations, while it takes the
value of 1 if the respondent answers that it is not justifiable to beat a wife in any of the
situations. It is created as an aggregated variable to remove any noise that may occur
in the other estimations, making it a more reliable estimate. Estimating using the whole
sample of women, only the aggregate estimate shows a significant effect. In all the estima-
tions it differs which variable shows a significant effect and not, but the aggregate variable
is always significant and shows an improvement in the norms. The only exception is in
the sample using only men. This may not be a surprise as the law mainly targets women,
but on the other hand it is as important, if not even more so, to change the norms and
attitudes of the men who are the ones performing the violence. The household bargaining
power is also tested with data on who does the decision making in the household. There
does not seem to be an increase after the law change.
There seems to be confusion about where, when and if the family law was implemented
in the regions. As this is a crucial part of my identification strategy I wanted to find a
clear cut answer. Different sources give different answers, and this alone is an indicator
that the information is limited. By using a variety of papers and contacting a scholar in
Ethiopia, I have tried to merge the information together to find out what really is the
case. This has however been more difficult than expected. I have also tried contacting
the authors of the papers giving information on this, with little success.
As the chartered cities Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are federal city administrations,
we can at least be certain that the new federal family law applies here. As a way of
testing the robustness I have estimated the same equations using different regions as
treated and controls. The estimates for the chartered cities are significant when using all
the other regions as counterfactuals, and this is quite convincing as several sources have
stated that they are the only regions where the federal family law is directly applicable.
However, if some of the other regions also implemented the family law, these will reduce
39
the effect measured and thus bias the estimates. Further robustness checks are done using
different regions one by one as counterfactuals for the chartered cities, which gives varying
results. Some give significant effects on all the estimates, while others have no significant
estimates. This may be due to noise or other unobserved factors. Estimates are also
done using appliances as the dependent variable. Expecting the law change to not have
an effect on the appliances of the household, this is used as a placebo to check for noise
that may be affecting the estimates. One of the estimates is significant, there are more
households with a phone after the law is introduced. This can be noise, but it can also be
explained by an increase in bargaining power for women, who then are assumed to have
a strong preference for phones, using their increased power to acquire one.
As predicted by the educational trends, there was no effect on education by the law
change. Although it is not especially motivating to see that the law change does not
show any significant effects on years of education, there may have been other events that
have intervened with the effect. If there was something that happened in the course of
these years that influenced education in the negative direction, this may have eradicated
the effect of the law change. If that was the case, the situation could have been even
worse without the law change. It may also be the case that such changes take longer time
than the period we have data for at this time. Also, because of the heterogeneity in a
country such as Ethiopia with eighty nationalities, it may be difficult to use other regions
as counterfactuals as they are widely different.
Similarities can be found with Stevenson & Wolfers (2006), which looks at a change in
the divorce laws across the US. While this thesis found an improvement in the attitudes
regarding domestic violence because of the family law change, Stevenson and Wolfers
found a decline in domestic violence because of the divorce law change. This shows that
laws increasing women’s rights do have an effect both in the US and in Ethiopia.
Further research can be done looking at similar law changes in other countries to see if
the results hold. Another important aspect is further evaluation of the family law, and
how it can be improved.Yigzaw et al. (2010) mentions that there is no notion of marital
rape in the law. This is an important issue that cannot be ignored. Rape victims are
often by the community forced to marry their rapists, as the women are now unwanted as
wives by other men. The Penal Code (1957) included in art.599 that there was not to be
any prosecution of the rapist in the event of a subsequent marriage. This exemption was
removed in the Criminal Code (2004), however homosexuality is still a crime, so there is
room for further improvement in this law too.
Appendix A gives an overview of the law changes from 1960 - 2010 provided by the World
Bank. Using the difference-in-difference approach one could look at the effects from the
law change in 1994 when the Constitution included a non-discrimination clause covering
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gender/sex in addition to allowing customary laws to be valid.
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1960a .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Y N N N/A
1960 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1961 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1962 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1963 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1964 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1965 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1966 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1967 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1968 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1969 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1970 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1971 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1972 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1973 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1974 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1975 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1976 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1977 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1978 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1979 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1980 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1981 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1982 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1983 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1984 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1985 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1986 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1987 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1988 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1989 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1990 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1991 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1992 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1993 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y N N N/A
1994 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y Y Y N
1995 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y Y Y N
1996 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y Y Y N
1997 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y Y Y N
1998 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y Y Y N
1999 Y N b Y Y N/A N N N N Y Y Y N
2000 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2001 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2002 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2003 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2004 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2005 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2006 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2007 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2008 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2009 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
2010 Y Y b Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N
Change in law which impacts women's rights
Trending change in legal system: e.g. shift from customary law to statutory law
New law enacted, but does not trigger indicators
(3) property regimes: (a) separation of property; (b) partial community; (c) full community; (d) deferred full or partial community; (e) other. 
..  Means data is unavailable
Source: The World Bank (1960-2010)
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